General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship under Social Laws: After Twenty Years an Unsolved Problem by Broden, Thomas F.
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Journal Articles Publications
1960
General Rules Determining the Employment
Relationship under Social Laws: After Twenty Years
an Unsolved Problem
Thomas F. Broden
Notre Dame Law School, thomas.f.broden.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas F. Broden, General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship under Social Laws: After Twenty Years an Unsolved Problem,
33 Temp. L.Q. 307 (1959-1960).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/602
1960]
GENERAL RULES DETERMINING THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY LAWS:
AFTER TWENTY YEARS AN UNSOLVED PROBLEM
THOMAS F. BRODEN, JR.J
Twenty-four years ago the Social Security Act was adopted.
Whereas in its inception it covered about half the labor force, now it
applies to nearly 90% of American workers. One would expect that
the basic rules of law applicable to such a vast program would, by now
a generation later, be rather well settled. Yet, in one very important
area of Social Security law, this is not true. This article discusses that
unsettled part of the law. It deals with the general rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship under the Federal
Social Security laws, with greatest emphasis on the old age, survivors
and disability insurance program. Surprisingly enough, this prob-
lematic area of a law which touches millions of people has received
little attention in legal literature.
In its inception the Social Security program provided benefits for
"employees" only. This excluded, of course, all self-employed persons.
Soon much litigation swirled around the distinction between "em-
ployees" and self-employed persons, or "independent contractors". If
one was classified as an employee, the employer was liable for the
employment tax and the employee was liable for the income tax and
benefits of coverage under the program. On the other hand, if one
was classified as an independent contractor, none of these legal con-
sequences ensued. In 1950 self-employed persons were brought under
the coverage of the program so that now the above distinctions are some-
what less meaningful. An independent contractor is entitled to the
benefits of the Social Security program the same as an employee.
However, important differences remain. The employee's tax con-
tribution is less than an independent contractor's and, from the point
of view of the hiring party, there are no employment taxes imposed if
the hired party is classified as an independent contractor. That these
differences are important is attested to by the fact that the Internal
Revenue Service makes many rulings every year distinguishing em-
ployees and independent contractors.
t Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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As administrative and judicial litigation has brought to light
borderline occupations Congress has expanded and made more detailed
the legislative definition of employee. In the original enactment Con-
gress merely specified that "The term 'employee' includes an officer of
a corporation."' Congress anticipated that there might be disputes as
to whether officers could be classified as employees and hoped to put the
matter to rest by the above provision. However there were a multitude
of other borderline occupations that Congress did not and could not
foresee. It was the responsibility of the administrative adjudicatory
processes of the Social Security Board and the Treasury Department
to pass upon these initially. To facilitate the uniform settlement of
these disputes these agencies promulgated interpretive regulations relat-
ing to the statutory term "employee". The Treasury Department's
regulations were promulgated on November 9, 1936,2 and the Social
Security Board promulgated its regulations on July 21, 1937.3 For
all practical purposes they were identical. The regulations emphasized
that the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor
turned largely on the degree of control that could be exercised over the
individual performing the service by the hiring party. But as the
following vital excerpt from the regulations shows, control was not the
exclusive relevant factor for consideration:
* * * The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating
that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other
factors characteristic of an employer, but not necessarily present
in every case, are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a
place to work, to the individual who performs the services.
In the beginning Internal Revenue rulings on the "employer-
employee" relationship appeared to take the position that a number of
factors including control of the details and means of performance were
relevant but that no single factor was conclusive.4 As time passed this
1. 49 Stat. 620, 647; P.L. 271, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 1101 (a) (6).
2. 1 FED. REG. Part. 1, p. 1764 (1936).
3. 2 FaD. REG. Part. 1, p. 1276 (1937).
4. In XVI-45-9030, S.S.T. 212, 1937-2 C.B. 397 persons who read literary ma-
terial for motion picture companies and then submitted synopsis of the material were
held not to be employees. They did the work intermittently, at home, and were not
controlled at to the manner of performing the work. The ruling stated: "In deter-
mining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the follow-
ing, among other things, should be considered: (1) The extent of control which the
employer may exercise over the details of the work either under the contract or in
fact; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the employer
or workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work; (4) whether
the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (5) the length of
time for which the person is employed; and (6) the method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job." In XVI-34-8889, S.S.T. 183, 1937-2 C.B. 388 club waiters
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flexible position withered and was replaced by an apparent mechanical
reliance on the single factor of control.' However it is evident in many
rulings that adherence to the control formula is a mere formality and
that factors other than control are more important to the result reached.
It has been said that in the early days of social security the Social
Security Board was more inclined to include borderline occupations
under the program than the Treasury Department.' Suffice it to say
that a goodly number of cases testing the agency determinations of the
employer-employee relationship question reached the United States
Courts.7  The results of these cases and the legal tests adopted by the
many district courts and courts of appeals were inconsistent.8 Some
judges emphasized the common law rules but differed among them-
selves as to what these rules were. They differed as to the extent to
which the factor of control was exclusive and conclusive. Others
rejected the common law rules and emphasized that the purpose of the
Act furnished guides to the meaning of the term "employee". Still
others adopted a combination of these two approaches.
In an effort to settle these differences among lower federal courts,
the Supreme Court, in 1947, rendered decisions in United States v.
Silk and Harrison v. Greyvan Lines9 and Bartels v. Birmingham and
Geer v. Birmingham,"0 hereafter referred to as the 1947 Supreme Court
cases. The opinions in these cases were designed to provide lower
federal courts, the agencies and private citizens with the general prop-
ositions of law which were applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship under the Social Security laws. They were
intended to be and were considered the leading cases on the subject.
were held to be employees. In the course of the ruling it was made clear that control
was a factor, but not the only factor to be considered. "Other factors characteristic
of an employer are the furnishing of tools and a place to work to the individual who
performs the services."
5. In REv. RuL. 57-79, 1957-1, C.B. 323, a schochet engaged by a poultry company
to slaughter poultry in accordance with the dietary laws of the Hebrew faith was
held to be an employee. He did his work on company premises during prescribed
hours on three specified days a week. The remainder of the time he did similar work
for others from his own home. In REv. RUL. 57-80, 1957-1 C.B. 324, a schochet who
performed slaughtering services off the premises of the company at his convenience
was held an independent contractor. In both rulings the almost "canned" formula
of control was invoked as determinative. However, it is evident that the right to
control the details and means of performance was equally absent in both cases. Per-
formance was controlled in both cases by the dietary laws. It was other factors more
related to the independent calling that were really determinative.
6. Testimony of Nelson A. Cruikshank representing the A.F.L. in hearings before
Senate Finance Committee on H.P. REs. 296, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1948).
7. Testimony of Adrian W. DeWind, of the Treasury Department in Hearings
Before Senate Finance Committee, on J. J. REs. 296, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 20
(1948).
8. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 705 (1947).
9. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
10. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
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Five months after the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham cases
were decided the Commissioner of Internal Revenue proposed new
regulations defining the employer-employee relationship under the
Social Security laws. 1' He expressly stated that the new regulations
were being proposed to conform to the Social Security laws as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in the Silk and Bartels v. Birmingham
cases. 2 Whereas existing regulations emphasized the control factor,
the proposed regulations emphasized the "Economic realities" of the
relationship. In the latter the control factor was identified as one of at
least six relevant factors to be considered. Shortly thereafter resolutions,
known as the "Status Quo" or "Gearhart" resolutions, were introduced
in the House and Senate to nullify what the proponents considered an
abandonment of the common law test to determine whether an individual
was an employee or an independent contractor and an unwarranted
attempt to administratively broaden coverage under the Social Security
laws. The resolution was enacted over President Truman's veto. 3
The resolution specified that the usual common law rules were to be
determinative of whether a person was an employee or an independent
contractor. Because of the enactment of this resolution, the proposed
regulations were not adopted '" and the then existing regulations
remained in force.
There is wide judicial disagreement as to the effect of this resolu-
tion. Purportedly Congress was merely declaring that the original
Congressional meaning of the word "employee" in the Social Security
laws was to be maintained. It is clear Congress felt the proposed
regulations would have expanded the original meaning and to that
extent the resolution squelched the proposed regulations. But the
courts differ widely as to the effect of the resolution on the then recent
leading cases of Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels v. Birmingham. Some
courts take the view that the resolution repudiates these 1947 cases
and restores earlier decisions of United States Court of Appeals.
Other courts take a diametrically opposed position, that is, the resolution
is a restatement of the principles of the 1947 cases. Since 1948 Con-
gress has clarified the definition of the term "employee" by specifically
including in it certain borderline groups in addition to officers of
corporations, to wit, certain agents and commission drivers, life in-
surance salesmen, homeworkers, and traveling and city salesmen. The
purpose of these specific inclusions is to remove any doubt as to the
11. 12 FED. REG. 7966 (1947).
12. 12 FFD. REG. 7966 (1947).
13. 62 STAT. 538 (1948).
14. 13 FED. REG. 5332 (1948) ; 1948-2, C.B. 141.
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classification of these borderline occupational categories. However as
to all other existing and new borderline groups the common law test
applies and the courts differ as to whether the broad general principles
of the 1947 Supreme Court cases are relevant.' 5 This is the present
unsettled situation regarding the basic rules applicable in determining
employer-employee status under the Social Security laws.
This study is not intended as a form of criticism of the Congress,
federal courts, the executive branch, the bar, employers or employees
(although I suspect all warrant some blame). On the contrary, it is
presented as one more piece of evidence to support the writer's suspicion
that practically all areas of the law hide such problematic skeletons in
their closet, and that if anyone takes the trouble to open enough doors
he will find them, and that the main business of the adjudicatory phases
of the judicial and administrative processes (except criminal cases) is
to render decisions in these borderline cases. No one takes the easy
cases to court. No one questions the fact that the 20 million "Joe and
Jane Bluecollars" who work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. for $2.31
per hour and are told to tighten nuts 3 and 4 as they pass them on the
assembly line are employees. The court cases and agency adjudications
deal with the relatively few half-breeds such as outside commission
salesmen, brokers, homeworkers, distributing agents and others who
are in a way "employees" and who are yet in a way "in business for
themselves". But unfortunately under the Social Security laws never
the twain shall meet. They either are or are not employees. And tax
liability now and benefit credit before 1950 rode on the category. The
writer suspects that as long as our economy continues to spawn such
15. As we have seen the 81st Congress (1948-1950) brought about the first sig-
nificant liberalization of social security coverage after the creation of the program in
1935. Among other things, the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 extended
coverage for the first time to self-employed persons. In the process of enacting this
comprehensive piece of legislation Congress hammered out a more detailed definition
of the term "employee". However the focus of attention on the definition was now
largely directed to the question of tax liability, the employee relationship no longer
being necessary to coverage under the Act. In general, those who were not employees
were eligible for Social Security benefits under the self-employment coverage pro-
visions. Congress retained existing provisions in defining the term "employee", i.e., it
included officers of corporations and persons who would be employees according to
the usual common-law rules. It then added provisions expressly including certain
agent or commission drivers (distributing meat, fruit and vegetables, bakery goods,
beverages and laundry and dry cleaning services), life insurance salesmen, home-
workers and traveling and city salesmen. The purpose was to remove any doubt as
to the classification of these borderline occupational categories.
The Treasury Department and Bureau of Internal Revenue promulgated new
regulations to take into account the many changes made by the 1950 Act. 16 FED.
REG. 12453 (1951). The special classes of occupations expressly included within the
definition of "employee" by the 1950 Act were described in more detail therein. How-
ever the regulations 26 C.F.R. 408.204(c), 16 FED. REG. 12460 (1951), relating to the
general definition of "employee" remained substantially unchanged from those pro-
nulgated in 1936. It will be recalled that these regulations emphasize, but are not
limited to, consideration of the factor of "control".
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half-breeds, either legitimately for business reasons or illegitimately
for reasons of tax avoidance, the courts and agencies will keep busy
deciding on which side of the line the particular borderline cases fall.
Our fate as humans at best is to assist in the partial solution of some
of our problems but never to be able to solve all of our present problems
or some of our problems for all time.
Another introductory remark-a word of caution-is in order.
Much of this study is devoted to the analysis of rules of law that have
been enunciated either by Congress, the federal courts or executive
agencies. The significance of these rules should be kept in proper
perspective. As was said above, when Congress provides that "em-
ployees" are covered under the Social Security laws, the legal rights
and obligations of the vast number of "Joe Bluecollars" are clear.
Under any of the various legal rules which serve as tests for the "em-
ployer-employee" relationship, these persons would be considered
"employees". This is not the case for the borderline occupations. It
is to assist in the adjudication of these borderline occupations that
more precise legal definitions of the term "employee" are provided by
legislation, by agency regulations and by court decisions. However,
because a borderline occupation is involved, it is almost impossible to
know how much the announced rule of law has to do with the outcome
of the case. In a case for refund of taxes a judge may be disposed to
find that outside commission salesmen, brokers or homeworkers are
independent contractors no matter how the rule of law is verbalized. On
the other hand, in a case by a widow to establish eligibility for Social
Security benefits, the same case might go the other way. This relative
impotence of rules of law in close cases is an inherent and unpredictable
characteristic of the adjudicatory process. It is not confined to Social
Security cases but it must be kept in mind as we proceed with our study.
EARLY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Some background knowledge is necessary to an understanding of
the relationship between the basic statutory test for the employer-
employee status and the leading 1947 Supreme Court cases. The
early court cases illuminate the problem faced by the Supreme Court
and then Congress.
The general approach of these early cases is exemplified by the
opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Texas Co. v. Higgins,"6 where
Judge Hand indicated that the Social Security Act "appears to take
over the term employee as the common law knew it. The regulation is
16. 118 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1941).
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in harmony with this assumption, for it enumerates the generally ac-
credited determinants in such cases, of which, the most important is
the putative employer's control over the employee's business." 7 This
is one of what came to be known as the "Bulk Sales Cases". They
dealt with the status of "Distributors" of the large petroleum companies
such as Texas Co., Standard Oil, and others. These distributors usu-
ally carried on business in their own names, often put up a substantial
investment, owned their own trucks, and hired and paid their own help.
On the other hand they sold at prices fixed by the large oil companies,
agreed to sell such petroleum products as were consigned to them, ac-
counted to the companies for the proceeds of all sales, were furnished
a company manual on the operation of "bulk stations", and could have
the agency terminated and the station taken over at cost whenever the
company desired. They were held to be independent contractors be-
cause the company had no right of control, no right of discharge, and
did not furnish tools or a place to work-factors enumerated in the
regulations.
However, instead of relying on a number of factors many of the
early cases put great emphasis on the factor of control alone. In many
of the cases one gets the impression that the judge considered the sole
question to be whether the alleged employer had the right to control
the means and details of the work performance. For example in the
Radio City Music Hall 18 case, Judge Learned Hand, two years after
his opinion in Texas Co. v. Higgins,"9 made the oft cited statement:
The test lies in the degree to which the principal may intervene to
control the details of the agent's performance; and that in the end
is all that can be said * * *20
In the case vaudevillian actors were held independent contractors and
the only factor discussed was that of control. The opinions of Hand in
Higgins and Radio City Music Hall demonstrate that there is a certain
treachery in drawing broad general propositions from particular cases.
Because a judge in one case alludes only to the factor of control does not
mean that in every case he would consider control to be the exclusive
and conclusive factor. Nevertheless, many of the early cases, even read
with caution, give one the impression that the factor of control was the
conclusive factor. This is true even though the opinions occasionally
allude to one or more other possibly relevant factors. In Jones v.
17. 118 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1941).
18. Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. U.S., 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
19. 118 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1941).
20. Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. U.S., 135 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1943).
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Goodson,2 cab drivers were held to be employees because, according to
the court, the company exercised a "reasonable measure of direction
and control".2 2 In his opinion, Judge Bratton also mentioned other
factors, namely, the manner of compensation, and the impermanence
of the relationship due to the company's right to discharge but the con-
trol factor appeared conclusive. In Glenn v. Beard,23 the independent
contractor label was applied to women who sewed at their farm homes
on materials provided by the taxpayer. The lack of control over the
method of performance was emphasized even though the work was to
be done according to specifications and patterns provided by the tax-
payer. The lack of occasional inspection by the taxpayer, payment on
the basis of a finished comforter or quilt, the freedom of the women to
work at their own pace and the right to sew for competitors of tax-
payer apparently negatived, in the eyes of Judge McAllister, the control
requisite for the employee status. Similarly in McGowan v. Lazeroff,"4
house to house commission salesmen were held independent contractors,
ostensibly because they could sell where and when they wished. This
result was reached even though the taxpayer fixed the price at which
merchandise was sold and could terminate the relationship at will.
Somewhat more realistic was the result in U.S. v. Mutual Truck-
ing Co.,25 where owner-operator of truck tractors and trailers were
held independent contractors because of the lack of control over their
work performance. The court also alluded to the fact that the fixed
fee per trip could not be considered "wages" within the meaning of the
term in the Act. And in U.S. v. Wholesale Oil Co.,2" a retail filling
station operator was held an employee because there was a "reasonable
measure of control over the method and means of performing the
service."
In contrast to the approach of these cases which either emphasized
or made exclusive the factor of control are a number of Social Security
decisions rendered after the Supreme Court decided N.L.R.B. v. Hearst
Publications." In the Hearst case, Justice Rutledge enunciated the
"economic reality" test and indicated that common law tort case prin-
ciples were not helpful in determining the employer-employee relation-
ship in social legislation cases. This approach was picked up and ap-
plied in a few Social Security cases, the most striking of which is U.S.
21. 121 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1941).
22. 121 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1941).
23. 141 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 724 (1944).
24. 148 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
25. 141 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1944).
26. 154 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1946).
27. 322 U.S. Ill.
[Vol. 33
1960] EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 315
v. Vogue,28 holding a seamstress who worked at a Vogue Store to be
an employee. In that case Judge Parker said:
Common law rules as to distinctions between servants and inde-
pendent contractors throw but little light on the question involved.
The Social Security Act like the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the National Labor Relations Act, was enacted pursuant to a public
policy unknown to the common law; and its applicability to it is
to be judged rather from the purposes that Congress had in mind
than from common law rules worked out for determining tort
liability.
Evidently Judge Parker considered control to be the exclusive common
law test because he suggested that the Treasury Regulations (which
included other factors such as the provision of tools, a place to work,
the right to discharge, and the manner of compensation) departed from
rules of common law.2 9
Other cases deemphasizing the common law rules and attaching
greater significance to the purposes of the legislation are U.S. v. Aber-
deen Aeire No. 24,"0 Nevin v. Rothensies,3 ' and Grace v. Magruder.12
Each of these cases shows the influence of the Hearst Publications case.
In Aberdeen Aerie, physicians who were elected annually by the lodge
to treat the members were held independent contractors. While recog-
nizing that the purposes of the legislation must be given great weight,
Judge Garrecht apparently did not agree with Judge Parker that com-
mon law rules throw little light on these cases. He weighed "all the
elements to be considered at common law" and in addition gave con-
sideration to the purpose of the Act in reaching his conclusion. Simi-
larly in the Nevin case, Judge Kirkpatrick in the United States District
Court indicated that the purpose of the Act must be considered in
determining the meaning of the term "employee" but that the "com-
mon law concepts" cannot be ignored. He held the operators of chain
drug stores to be independent contractors even though to a considerable
extent control was in the parent corporation but other factors such as
risk and the possibility of profit dictated that conclusion. In the Grace
case, Judge Miller held that coal hustlers who stored the company's
coal in customers' bins were employees both according to the common
law rules and according to the "standard of interpretation" of the Vogue
case and the Hearst case.
28. 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1944).
29. 145 F.2d 609, 611 (4th Cir. 1944).
30. 148 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1945).
31. 151 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1945), affirming 58 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
32. 148 F.2d 679 (D.C. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720 (1945).
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These early cases demonstrate that there was a lack of agreement
among the judges as to the basic test applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship. Some thought the common law rules
determinative but differed among themselves as to the content of these
rules particularly as to the extent to which the factor of control was
conclusive. Others, notably Judge Parker in the Vogue case, re-
pudiated the common law rules as the test and looked to the purposes of
the legislation for guidance. Still others adopted a position combining
the common law rules with the purposes of the legislation.
THE 1947 SUPREME COURT CASES
In 1947 the Supreme Court handed down two opinions in cases
involving employee-independent contractor status disputes under the
Social Security laws. The first opinion was in the case of U.S. v.
Silk and Harrison v. Greyvan Lines.3" The second opinion was de-
livered a week later in Bartels v. Birmingham and Geer v. Birming-
ham.34  They purport to establish broad general principles applicable
in determining the employer-employee relationship under the Social
Security laws. In the Silk and Greyvan cases, taxpayers sued to re-
cover employment taxes paid under the Social Security Act. They
contended that the persons for whose benefit the taxes were paid were
independent contractors not employees as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue had concluded. In the Silk case the status of two groups, coal
unloaders and coal truck drivers, was in question. In the Greyvan
case the status of moving van drivers was in question. The Court up-
held the Commissioner as to the coal unloaders in the Silk case. The
Court said:
* * * The unloaders provided only picks and shovels. They had
no opportunity to gain or lose except from the work of their hands
and these simple tools. That the unloaders did not work regularly
is not significant. * * * They are of the group that the Social
Security Act was intended to aid. Silk was in a position to exer-
cise all necessary supervision over their simple tasks. Unloaders
have often been held to be employees in tort cases.35
However, a majority of the court in an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Reed, held the coal truck and moving van drivers to be inde-
pendent contractors:
* * * These driver-owners are small businessmen. They own
their own trucks. They hire their own helpers. In one instance
33. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
34. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
35. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 718 (1947).
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they haul for a single business, in the other for any customer. The
distinction, though important, is not controlling. It is the total
situation, including the risk undertaken, the control exercised, the
opportunity for profit from sound management, that marks these
driver-owners as independent contractors."6
The Court indicated that a number of factors must be evaluated in
determining whether a person is an independent contractor or an em-
ployee:
* * * The Social Security Agency and the courts will find that
degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in
facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the claimed
independent operation are important for decision. No one is con-
trolling nor is the list complete. These unloaders and truckers and
their assistants are from one standpoint an integral part of the
business of retailing coal or transporting freight. Their energy,
care and judgment may conserve their equipment or increase their
earnings but Greyvan and Silk are the directors of their businesses.
On the other hand, the truckmen hire their own assistants, own
their trucks, pay their own expenses, with minor exceptions, and
depend upon their own initiative, judgment and energy for a large
part of their success."
Justice Reed's opinion in the Silk case is put into proper perspec-
tive when read in the light of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals han-
dling of the case. Circuit Judges Phillips, Bratton and Huxman, in an
opinion written by Judge Huxman, upheld the District Court's finding
that neither the coal workers nor coal unloaders were employees. 8 In
making this decision Judge Huxman alluded only to the factor of
"control". 39  He quotes that portion of Regulation 90 that related to
control-leaving out those parts dealing with the following factors:
right to discharge, provision of tools, provision of place to work, desig-
nation of relationship and manner of compensation. He cites a passage
from a prior Tenth Circuit case 4 which spells out the "control" factor
as the determinative test. Finally Judge Huxman analyzes the undis-
puted facts in the light of the question of control and concludes: 41
36. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
37. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
38. U.S. v. Silk, 155 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1946).
39. 155 F.2d 356, 358 (10th Cir. 1946). This is true even though at the outset
Judge Huxman denies that a strict common law test should be applicable:
* * * [The Social Security Act] * * * is remedial in its scope and should be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial objective. It may be conceded that
the strict common law concept of employer and employee relationship is not the
test for determining such relationship when it comes into question under the
remedial provisions of the Act.
40. Jones v. Goodson, 121 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir. 1941).
41. U.S. v. Silk, 155 F.2d 356, 359.
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The undisputed facts fail to establish such reasonable measure of
direction and control over the method and means of performing the
services performed by these workers as is necessary to establish a
legal relationship of employer and employee between [the tax-
payer] and the workers in question.
There is a strong suggestion in the Silk case that Justice Reed
thought that even relying on the "control" factor exclusively, the un-
loaders would be classified as employees. He says "Silk was in a
position to exercise all necessary supervision over their simple tasks.
Unloaders have often been held to be employees in tort cases." 42
However, Reed, speaking for the Court, makes it clear that Judge
Huxman placed too much emphasis on the "control" factor to the
exclusion of others, such as the meager investment of the unloaders
(picks and shovels) and their lack of risk.43 In footnote 11 of Justice
Reed's opinion " he sets out what he considers the reasons for the lower
court's conclusion. The footnote consists of a series of quotations from
Judge Huxman's opinion all of which portray the factor of control
as being determinative. Footnote 3 of Justice Rutledge's concurring
opinion indicates that both the District Judge and the Judges of the
Court of Appeals treat the case as if it turned upon the factor of control
exclusively.4"
Similarly when Greyvan Lines, Inc. v. Harrison, was before the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 6 Judge Sparks writing for
himself and Judges Major and Kerner emphasized the factor of control
as being determinative of the question of the status of moving van
drivers. He concluded that the Company did not exercise sufficient
control over the drivers to render them employees. To him the fact
that the drivers were free to employ or not to employ helpers was
decisive:
We think it cannot be said that a truckman to whom is left the
determination of whether to do the work himself or engage others
to do it is a mere employee.47
Justice Reed agreed with the conclusion of Judges Sparks, Major
and Kerner that moving van drivers were not employees and with the
conclusion of Judges Huxman, Phillips and Bratton that coal truck
drivers were not employees. He disagreed however with their reason-
42. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 718 (1947).
43. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 718 (1947).
44. 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
45. 331 U.S. 704, 720 (1947).
46. 156 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1946).
47. 156 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1946).
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ing in that it made the "control" factor exclusive and the conclusive
test :
It is the total situation, including the risk undertaken, the control
exercised, the opportunity for profit from sound management, that
marks these driver owners as independent contractors. 48
Again in footnote 11 of his opinion Justice Reed indicated what he
conceived to be the lower court's reasons for its conclusion. These
were a series of quotations from Judge Sparks' opinion indicating that
the factor of control was conclusive.49 And Justice Rutledge in foot-
note 3 of his concurring opinion observes that in Greyvan the Circuit
Court of Appeals found the factor of control to be conclusive. °
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy agreed with Reed's statement
of the applicable principles but thought they dictated the conclusion
that the driver-owners were employees. Rutledge was non-committal
as to the conclusion. He thought that in borderline occupations, such
as these truckers, the Supreme Court should lay down the general
principles and then remand the case to the District Court. It would
then be the duty of the District Court to apply the principles to the
facts and render the proper conclusion.
51
A week after handing down the opinion in the Silk case the
Supreme Court announced the decision in Bartels v. Birmingham.52
In that case the taxpayers were operators of public dance halls who
were required by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to pay employ-
ment taxes for the personnel of "name brands". These bands usually
made one-night stands at the halls. The operators contended that the
band personnel were not their employees but were the employees of the
band leader and that the leaders were independent contractors in rela-
tion to the operators. The Government contended that the written
contract between the band and the operators expressly provided that
all band personnel including the leader were employees of the operator
and that this was determinative. District Judge Dewey " held against
the Government and in favor of the operators. He regarded the
contractual provision as inconclusive and held that the real power of
control over the band personnel was in the band leader not in the dance
hall operators and that therefore the band personnel were employees of
48. 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
49. 331 U.S. 704, 716-717 (1947).
50. 331 U.S. 704, 720-721 (1947).
51. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719-722 (1947).
52. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
53. 59 F. Supp. 84 (1945*).
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the leader who in turn was an independent contractor. This was
reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in a split decision.
Judges Johnson and Woodrough thought the contractual provision
which expressly gave the operators the right to control the band person-
nel was dispositive of the issue, there being "no clear and convincing
evidence that the right of control mutually was abrogated so as to have
changed the employment relationship". 54 Judge Gardner dissented on
the grounds that the District Court's finding of fact-that the band
leader had the right to control band personnel-was not clearly errone-
ous and should therefore be sustained on appeal.
A majority of the Supreme Court thought the band personnel
were employees of the leader not of the dance hall operators and thus
held the latter not liable for employment taxes:
We are of the opinion that the elements of employment mark the
band leader as the employer in these cases. The leader organizes
and trains the band. He selects the members. It is his musical
skill and showmanship that determines the success or failure of
the organization. The relations between him and the other mem-
bers are permanent; those between the band and the operator are
transient. Maintenance costs are a charge against the price re-
ceived for the performance. He bears the loss or gains the profit
after payment of the members' wages and the other band ex-
penses. 55
Justice Reed, who wrote the majority opinion, indicated that the "con-
trol clause" of the written contract should not be conclusive of the
matter as Circuit Judges Johnson and Woodrough had decided. Reed
reiterated what had been announced a week earlier in the Silk case:
In United States v. Silk, supra, we held that the relationship of
employer-employee, which determines the liability for employment
taxes under the Social Security Act, was not to be determined
solely by the idea of control which an alleged employer may or
could exercise over the details of the service rendered to his
business by the worker or workers. Obviously control is charac-
teristically associated with the employer-employee relationship, but
in the application of social legislation employees are those who as
a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to
which they render service. In Silk, we pointed out that perma-
nency of the relation, the skill required, the investment in the
facilities for work, and opportunities for profit or loss from the
activities were also factors that should enter into judicial deter-
mination as to the coverage of the Social Security Act. It is the
total situation that controls. These standards are as important in
54. 157 F.2d 295, 304 (8th Cir. 1946).
55. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947).
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the entertainment field as we have just said, in Silk, they were in
that of distribution and transportation.56
As with any case in an unsettled area of the law the shadowy
nuances of the 1947 Supreme Court cases are only apparent under the
illumination of the unsettled background. In the light of this back-
ground, it is apparent that there were a number of different theories as
to the proper interpretation of the term "employee" available for a
majority of the court to embrace. The court could have said that the
common law meaning was intended and that at common law the factor
of control was determinative. The attractive authority of Judge
Learned Hand in the Radio City Music Hall case " could be marshalled
in support of this theory. Or the court could have said the common law
meaning was controlling and that this required the evaluation of a
number of factors including but not limited to the factor of control.
Many of the Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions could be brought
forth in support of this approach. At the other end of the spectrum
the court could have embraced the theory of Judge Parker in the
Vogue case,5s rejecting the common law altogether.
Significantly Justice Reed avoided this disagreement over the
nature and scope of the common law rules in this matter. However,
on the one hand he made clear that control was not the exclusive factor
to be considered and, on the other hand, without singling out the
Vogue case for express condemnation, he made clear that those factors
which many considered a part of the common law test were relevant
to the question. Actually Justice Reed's theory of interpretation is
closer to those lower court cases which used as a basis of interpretation
a combination of: (1) what they conceived to be the common law
rules, i.e., a number of factors including control with, (2) the purpose
of the Act.
By side-stepping the disagreement over the relevance of the com-
mon law rules Justice Reed departed from Justice Rutledge's approach
in the historic N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications case.5 9 In that case
Justice Rutledge premised his opinion on the controversial and in-
flammatory proposition that Congress rejected the "traditional com-
mon-law conceptions." Instead the meaning of the term "employee"
in the N.L.R.A. was to be determined primarily by the purpose of the
Act. If, because of the "underlying economic facts" of a borderline
occupational group's status the Act's remedy of collective bargaining
56. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
57. 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943).
58. 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1944).
59. 332 U.S. 111 (1944).
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was necessary to prevent inequality of bargining power and economic
unrest, the group should be considered "employees" rather than "inde-
pendent contractors". It is worthy of note that Justice Reed concurred
in a separate opinion in Hearst indicating his disagrement with Rut-
ledge's reasoning.
Reed's reference in Silk to the Hearst 6 decision must not be con-
sidered an incorporation by these references of everything Rutledge
said in his Hearst opinion. A superficial view might find Reed's
reliance on Hearst inconsistent with his test that takes into account
many common law factors including control. However it must be
observed that Reed does not join in Rutledge's strictures against the
common law in general. What Reed does embrace in Hearst are
those statements which disapprove a test that relies solely on the factor
of control, a test often attributed to tort cases involving the question of
the master-servant relationship.6 He further relies on and approves of
Hearst to the extent that it emphasizes the relevance of the purpose of
the legislation.62 With these significant limitations the relationship of
the Hearst and Silk cases is the proper perspective.
This also sheds some light on the approach to this question of the
majority of the Supreme Court in 1947. Instead of Justice Rutledge,
Justice Reed was designated to write the opinions for the court in
U.S. v. Silk and Harrison v. Greyvan,63 in Bartels v. Birmingham and
Geer v. Birmingham,4 in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,65 pre-
senting the question of the test applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
Cosmopolitan Co. v. McAllister,6 6 presenting the same question under
the Jones Act. The court in the main apparently preferred Reed's posi-
tion which was less antagonistic to the common law background than
Rutledge's.
LOWER FEDERAL COURT REACTION TO 1947 CASES BEFORE
STATUS Quo RESOLUTION
Further light is shed on the meaning of the Silk, Greyvan and
Bartels v. Birmingham cases by lower federal courts during the year
preceding the enactment of the Status Quo Resolution. These lower
courts applied the principles of the Silk, Greyvan and Bartels v. Birm-
60. N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 125 (1944).
61. U.S. v. Silk, 704, 713 (1947).
62. U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
63. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
64. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
65. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
66. 337 U.S. 783 (1949).
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ingham cases in eleven cases dealing variously with the Social Security
laws,6 7 the Fair Labor Standards Act,' and disputes involving em-
ployee reinstatement under the draft laws.69
The general reaction of the lower federal courts was that the
Supreme Court cases introduced no new principles into the law. In a
penetrating opinion 7' District Judge Graven said:
The factors referred to by the Supreme Court in the cases of
United States v. Silk, supra, Harrison, Collector, v. Greyvan, Inc.,
supra, and Bartels v. Birmingham, supra, are not new to the law.
All of them have been noted at some time or other in cases in
the general field of law having to do with the legal responsibility
of one person for the actions of another.7'
A similar sentiment was expressed by Circuit Judge Carrecht: 72
Whether we are dealing with cases involving the responsi-
bility of a person for the acts of those under his control or with
remedial or regulatory statutes, the basic distinctions between an
employee and an independent contractor are the same.
Although it is always difficult to estimate how much difference the
verbalized rules make to the result in a case, it is interesting to examine
the results of some of these cases. In Henry Broderick, Inc., v.
Squire,7 a real estate company sought refund of Social Security taxes
paid on some of its real estate brokers. The District Court, before the
Supreme Court decided the Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels v. Birmingham
cases, held the brokers to be employees. In his opinion District Judge
Leavy emphasized very strongly that common law concepts were not
controlling in determining the employer-employee relationship in Social
Security cases. By the time the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reviewed Judge Leavy's ruling the Supreme Court decisions had been
rendered. The Ninth Circuit reversed and relied exclusively on the
Silk and Greyvan cases. Similarly the Tenth Circuit relied on Silk,.
67. Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Broderick v. Squire, 163
F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947); Schwing v. U.S., 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948); Fahs v.
Tree-Gold Co-op., 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948); Martin v. F.S.A., 73 F. Supp. 482
(W.D. Pa. 1947) ; Tapager v. Birmingham, 75 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Iowa 1948); and
Atlantic Coast Life v. U.S., 76 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. So. Car. 1948).
68. McComb v. McKay, 164 2d 40 (8th Cir. 1947) and Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. McComb, 165 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. den. 333 U.S. 862 (1948).
69. Brown v. Luster, 165 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1947) and Hudspeth v. Standard
Oil, N.J., 74 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Ark. 1947).
70. Tapager v. Birmingham, 75 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
71. Judge Graven went on to say that control was one of many factors to be
considered and that it should not receive primary or paramount consideration.
72. Brown v. Luster, 165 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1947).
73. 69 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Wash. 1946), rev'd, 163 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947).
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Greyvan and Bartels v. Birmingham to reverse a District Court deci-
sion that cab drivers were employees under the Social Security laws.74
The District Court decision had been rendered before the Supreme
Court decided the 1947 cases. The results of these cases suggest that
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits read the 1947
Supreme Court cases as not making great upheavals or changes from the
traditional test for the employer-employee relationship. In general the
overall results in these eleven cases decided during this period reflect
no great upheaval in the law. In six cases the courts held the indi-
viduals involved to be employees.75 In the other five the courts con-
cluded the persons involved were independent contractors.76
However, just as courts differed before the Supreme Court deci-
sions of 1947 as to the test for the employer-employee relationship so
some of these same differences persisted after the 1947 cases. For
example the Third Circuit in an opinion written by District Judge
McGranery saw in the 1947 Supreme Court cases an approach which
greatly emphasized the purposes of the Act and correspondingly de-
emphasized "technical common law concepts." 77 The court said:
That is to say, the Act was aimed to protect those humble
workers whose livelihood is dependent upon another rather than
upon the public at large, and who are subject to unemployment
disability and old-age insecurity, and the issue is whether these
tailors are in that class.
Judge McGranery's overriding emphasis on the purposes of the
legislation is more closely associated with Justice Rutledge's approach
in the Hearst case than to Justice Reed's views in Silk, Greyvan, Bartels
v. Birmingham and Rutherford v. McComb.78 It is also reminiscent of
74. Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947).
75. Social Security Laws:
Schwing v. U.S., 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948) tailors; Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op.,
166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948) fruit craters; Tapager v. Birmingham, 75 F. Supp. 375
(N.D. Iowa 1948) outside commission salesmen; and Atlantic Coast Life v. U.S., 76
F. Supp. 627 (E.D. So. Car. 1948) insurance agents.
F.L.S.A.:
McComb v. McKay, 164 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1947) door makers for railroad;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. McComb, 165 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. den.,
333 U.S. 862 (1948) telegraph agents.
76. Social Security Laws:
Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947) cab drivers; Broderick v.
Squire, 163 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947) real estate brokers; and Martin v. F.S.A., 73
F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Pa. 1947) operator of grain elevator at ports.
Draft Laws:
Brown v. Luster, 165 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1947) outside salesmen; and Hudspeth
v. Standard Oil, N.J., 74 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Ark. 1947) bulk plant operator.
77. Schwing v. U.S., 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948).
78. Supra.
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the old common law "independent calling" test. The same approach is
evident in Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op Growers of Florida,7" where in a
split decision Judge Holmes writing for himself and Judge Lee said
that the 1947 Supreme Court cases indicate that "* * * the question
of control is not the sole or determining factor. The ultimate criteria
are to be found in the purposes of the act." 80
What is most significant about the eleven cases decided during this
period is their treatment of the factor of control. All read the 1947
Supreme Court cases as rejecting the factor of control as the exclusive
test for determining the employer-employee relationship and it is in-
conceivable how any other reading is possible. As we have seen this
is no mean conclusion.
Beyond this important conclusion, however, there is a subtle but
nevertheless clear difference of opinion as to the relative significance to
be attributed to the factor of control. At one end of the spectrum is
the approach of the Third and Fifth Circuits which suggests that the
purpose of the legislation to protect humble workers from unemploy-
ment disability and old age insecurity furnishes the key test and that
the various factors mentioned in the 1947 cases are subordinate but
may be helpful in determining whether the individual in question is
one of those "humble workers whose livelihood is dependent upon
another rather than upon the public at large." In the middle of the
spectrum is the approach suggested by Judge Graven that the various
factors mentioned by the Supreme Court and other unspecified factors
furnish the basis for determination. In applying these factors, control
is on a par with, not above, any other factor.8 At the other end of
the spectrum is the approach of the Tenth Circuit in Woods v.
Nicholas 82 where Judge Bratton, writing for himself and Judge Phillips
said that control is just one among many factors to be examined but
seems to give to the control factor a primary though not exclusive
influence. In deciding the cab owners and drivers were not employees
of the taxpayer, Judge Bratton said: "
Here, the taxpayer did not hire the owners or drivers of the
taxicabs, and did not have any right of control in respect to the
method and manner in which they did their work. He did not
have the right to determine whether they should work on the
day or the night shift, did not have the right to determine which
79. 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948).
80. 166 F.2d 40, 44.
81. See also Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 76 F. Supp. 627, 630-631 (E.D.
So. Car. 1948).
82. 163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947).
83. 163 F.2d 615, 621.
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cab or cabs they should drive, and did not have the right to deter-
mine the routes over which they should operate. He did not pay
they any wages or like compensation, and he did not have the
right to discipline or discharge them. He merely furnished the
licence and certificate of convenience and necessity, as well as cer-
tain facilities, for which he was compensated. His primary com-
pensation was the fixed fee paid him. And he was paid certain
additional sums to be applied on the rental on the salaries of the
telephone operators. The owners of the cabs bore their own re-
sponsibility with respect to the method and manner of operating
the cabs, and the drivers were responsible to them in that respect.
In that regard, neither the owners nor the drivers were responsible
to the taxpayers.
Emphasis on the control factor is even more pointed in the case
of Martin v. F.S.A.,84 where Judge Fallmer held operators of grain
elevators at ports to be independent contractors rather than employees
of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Judge Fallmer said:
I therefore conclude that the facts in this case during the en-
tire period covered by the employment of this wage earner un-
mistakenly indicate that Pennsylvania in its dealings with Western
was only concerned with the results to be obtained; that for the
period prior to January 1, 1940, or thereafter, not a solitary in-
stance of the exercise of control over personnel or the manner of
operation existed; * * *
The Judge emphasized control even though three paragraphs earlier he
had quoted from the Silk case to the effect that a number of factors are
to be considered.
These eleven cases reveal that while the 1947 Supreme Court
cases did not dispel all differences as to the appropriate test for deter-
mining the employer-employee relationship, they did tend to eliminate
reliance on the factor of control exclusively. As to the relation of the
Supreme Court cases to the "usual common law rules" lower federal
court opinions are less informative. This is understandable in view of
the fact that the 1947 Supreme Court cases avoided discussion of the
common law. Nevertheless the Tenth Circuit in Woods v. Nicholas,
suggests that control was the exclusive law test,85 and that the Supreme
Court cases therefore depart from the common law. On the other
hand, Judge Graven in Tapager v. Birmingham,"8 and Judge Garrecht
in Brown v. Luster,7 suggest that the factors referred to in the 1947
Supreme Court cases are factors which have been employed in common
84. 73 F. Supp. 482, 495 W.D. Pa. 1947.
85. 163 F.2d 615, 618-619 (1947).
86. 75 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
87. 165 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1947).
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law cases.88 More typically the Ninth, Eight and Third Circuits were
ambiguous on the point, satisfying themselves with the observation that
"technical common law concepts" or "narrow and legalistic interpreta-
tions" are not proper.89 These opinions do not specify whether all
common law concepts are to be considered objectionable as "technical",
"legalistic", and "narrow" or only some alleged common law tests.
However it is not unlikely that the latter is the intended meaning. This
is particularly true of the Third and Ninth Circuit cases. Both these
cases reversed District Court decisions which had held persons to be
independent contractors primarily on the basis of the "control" test.
The Courts of Appeals' strictures against "technical common law con-
cepts" should be read in the light of the District Courts' positions limit-
ing the common law test to the factor of control. 90
EMPLOYEE ACCORDING TO THE "USUAL COMMON LAW RULES"
As we have seen up to 1948 there was no attempt by Congress to
define the term employee, other than to indicate that it was meant to
include officers of corporations. In 1948, the Status Quo Resolution
was enacted.
Since then the statutory phrase "the usual common law rules appli-
cable in determining the employer-employee relationship" 91 has pro-
vided basic definition of the employer-employee relationship under the
Social Security laws. Some have assumed that the common law rules
referred to are those applicable in tort cases when vicarious liability
turns on the existence of the "master-servant" relationship. Most of
the early Social .Security cases we have analyzed would lend support to
this assumption. Many judges considered the common law rules ap-
plicable in determining the "master-servant" relationship in tort cases
were the rules to be used in determining the employer-employee relation-
ship under the Social Security laws. However, if Congress had in-
tended these rules exclusively (presuming agreement as to what they
were), it would have been much more precise to have substituted
"master-servant" for "employer-employee" in the statutes.9 2
88. Judge Graven thought at common law the control factor would be given
"primary and paramount consideration." 75 F. Supp. 375, 388 (1948).
89. Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire, 163 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1947) ; McComb
v. McKay, 164 F.2d 40, 49 (8th Cir. 1947); and Schwing v. U.S., 165 F.2d 518, 520
(3d Cir. 1948).
90. Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire, 69 F. Supp. 109 (1946) and Schwing v. U.S.,
65 F. Supp. 227 (1946).
91. 62 STAT. 438 (1948) ; 26 U.S.C. (1954 Code) Sec. 3121.
92. The "master-servant" terminology was recommended to the Senate Finance
Committee in 1950. Hearings before Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 6000, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2204 (1950).
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As a matter of fact there is a deceptive simplicity about the phrase
"the usual common law rules." Justice Rutledge in N.L.R.B. v. Hearst
Publications,9 3 conclusively exploded the myth that there is some
simple, uniform and easily applicable test which the courts have used
to distinguish employees from independent contractors. Literally, in
common parlance, and in the law "employer-employee" is often used
without regard to the "master-servant" relationship and the attendant
"servant-independent contractor" legal distinction. There are many
common law rules having no relation to the "servant-independent con-
tractor" distinction applicable in determining whether in the broad
sense of the term one is an employee.94
The term "employee" had different shades of meaning in different
relationships. We need not recount them all. We are not per-
mitted arbitrarily to choose between them. Where, in an insur-
ance policy, a term is open to two or more constructions we are
required to adopt that one more favorable to the insured. * * *
This is just rule because insurance policies are written by the
insurers. * * * "Employee" may mean any one who render serv-
ices to another.9 5
Justice Rutledge made this point in the Hearst case." Among
other authorities he cited Lumley v. Gye 97 to exemplify the proposition
that there were a variety of common law rules applicable in determining
the employer-employee relationship depending upon the purpose for
which the determination is to be made. In Lumley v. Gye the court
held that an employer could recover damages from a third person who
maliciously induced an employee to breach the contract of employment.
The defendant and Justice Coleridge in dissent argued that this rule
only applied to workmen in the "master-servant" relationship. But a
majority of the court disagreed. Justice Crompton said: 9
* * * I think that, where a party has contracted to give his per-
sonal services for a certain time to another, the parties are in the
relation of employer and employee or master and servant, within
the meaning of this rule.
93. 322 U.S. 111, 120-124 (1944).
94. "In its broad signification and in common or popular speech, employee is
defined as one who is employed; any one who renders labor or services to another
* * *". 30 C.J.S. 227 (1942). Tentative Draft No. 3 of the SECOND RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, 18 (1955), Comment c to Section 2 recognizes that the broad
meaning of the term "employee" has received some acceptance. "In some Statutes, how-
ever the term "employee" has been given a much broader meaning than that given herein
to the term "servant". This has been the tendency of the interpretation of both Federal
and State Acts dealing with social security, unemployment insurance, minimum wage,
fair labor practices and similar matters."
95. 1 Bouv. Law Dict., 1035 (Rawle's Third Rev.).
96. N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 11, 120 n.19 (1944).
97. 1853 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rept. 789.
98. 1853 El. & Bl. 216, 229; 118 Eng. Rept. 749, 754.
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The usual common law contract rules applicable in determining
whether or not a contract of employment is in existence are in this
category. These rules, which include, for example, principles of law
applicable to offer and acceptance, obviously are totally distinct from
the vicarious tort liability rules.
Also there are common law rules which have been developed to
determine whether a person, is, in the broad sense, an employee en-
titled to restitution for services rendered to another by mistake. These
have no relation to the "servant-independent contractor" distinctions
arising out of tort cases but rather relate to quasi-contractual prin-
ciples.99
Other examples of "usual common law rules" include the follow-
ing. A principal is liable in contract or tort for the acts of his agent,
regardless of whether he is a servant, independent contractor or neither,
if the principal directs a specific tortious act or result,100 if the agent
makes certain representations which he is authorized or apparently au-
thorized to make,' 01 and if the situation is such that the duty to protect
the third person may not be delegated by the principal.' Each of these
situations involves "usual common law rules applicable in determining"
whether the agent has been actually or apparently authorized or, in the
broad sense, employed to act for the principal. This broad use of the
term employed as applicable to agents not only comports with laymen's
terminology but also is consistent with the approach of the Restatement
of the Law of Agency. Time and time again in the Comments and
Illustrations appended to general common law rules the term employ
is used without regard to the "servant-independent contractor" dis-
tinction. One able writer disagrees with this broad use of the term
employ in relation to agents. Professor Ferson in his Principles of
Agency .0 sharply distinguishes between "employing servants" and
"authorizing agents". His approach would not admit of an "agent"
being "employed". 0 4 Would that the Congress were as careful in its
use of terms. However, it is feared the Congressional ways in the use
of language are more akin to the layman's than to Professor Ferson's.
99. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, Secs. 40 and 41.
100. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 251(a).
101. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 251(b).
102. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 251(a).
103. Brooklyn, 1954.
104. Ferson's basic analysis differs from that of the RESTATEMENT. The latter
considers servants a species of agents (RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY SECTION 2) whereas
Ferson distinguishes servants from agents, FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY, pp. 122-123.
For him servants perform non-juristic acts, agents perform juristic acts. The Fourth
edition of MECHEM'S OUTLINES OF AGENCY lends some support to Professor Ferson's
approach. It distinguishes agents from servants on the basis of the type of act per-
formed, MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY, Sections 12-14 (4th Ed. 1952).
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It is evident from these examples that the employer-employee re-
lationship is not limited to the master-servant relationship or realm
alone and that the phrase "the usual common law rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship" is an ambiguous one.
To determine what Congress intended by this phrase we shall now
examine its legislative history.
(TO BE CONTINUED)
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